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Abstract
In this paper I propose to analyse the binary notion of per-
sonal data and highlight its limits, in order to propose a dif-
ferent conception of personal data. From a risk regulation
perspective, the binary notion of personal data is not partic-
ularly fit for purpose, considering that data collection and
information flows are tremendously big and complex. As a
result, the use of a binary system to determine the applica-
bility of EU data protection law may be a simplistic
approach. In an effort of bringing physics and law together,
certain principles elaborated within the quantum theory are
surprisingly applicable to data protection law, and can be
used as guidance to shed light on many of today’s data
complexities. Lastly, I will discuss the implications and the
effects that certain processing operations may have on the
possibility of qualifying certain data as personal. In other
terms, how the chances to identify certain data as personal
is dependent upon the processing operations that a data
controller might put in place.
1 Introduction
Personal data is any information related to an identified
or identifiable natural person.1 Sometimes it is obvious
which information constitutes personal data; some other
times the exercise becomes complex and may lead to
unexpected results. The paramount principle upon
which EU data protection law is based is the possibility
of qualifying certain information as personal data.
Whenever the piece of information carried by data can
be separated from the physical person to whom that
information refers, the rules and safeguards stemming
from EU data protection law become inapplicable. In
this sense, data is conceived as binary: it is either per-
sonal or not.
The possibility of identifying, directly or indirectly, a
person through a number of pieces of information
– individual or combined – highlights the complexities
that data protection experts are currently experiencing
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1. The definition we adopt is based on EU data protection law. See after
the third section.
when dealing with technologies and techniques such as
Big Data,2 Cloud Computing,3 data mining and collec-
tion of information through the Internet of Things
(IoT).4 Devices of all sorts around us are constantly col-
lecting information to provide services, yet not all data
collected falls within the category of personal data strict-
ly speaking. This amount of non-personal information
can, however, quickly lead to the identification of a
physical person and reveal very personal aspects such as
political orientation or sexual preferences.
In this article, I propose to analyse the binary notion of
personal data and highlight its limits in the current EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).5 Breyer v.
Deutschland6 shows that from a risk-regulation perspec-
tive, the binary notion is not particularly fit for purpose,
considering that data collection and information flows
are complex processes. This calls for a different concep-
tion of personal data, which should go beyond its binary
definition, and instead, focus on its inherent, relative
nature. Data could indeed be personal and non-personal
at the same time: the relevant distinction can be made
only in a specific moment, while putting the data in the
context of processing operations carried out around it.
This article, therefore, purports to show that the use of
a binary system to determine the applicability of EU
data protection law may be too simplistic an approach.
For this purpose, it employs quantum mechanics as a
guide to shed more light on the matter. At the beginning
of 1900, when certain observations on matter could not
be described through classical physics, physicists began
2. Big Data has been defined as a data set whose size is beyond the ability
of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage and ana-
lyse. See J. Manyika, M. Chui, B. Brown, J. Bughin, R. Dobbs, C. Rox-
burgh & A.H. Byers. Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Com-
petition, and Productivity (2011).
3. Cloud Computing has to be understood as a methodology through
which a vast measure of pooled and virtualised resources can be
accessed. See A. El Khoury, ‘Data Protection and Risk Regulation. Cloud
Computing: A Case Study’ (LLM thesis on file at LUISS School of
Governance, Rome).
4. With the term ‘Internet of Things’, we refer to a global network infra-
structure linking uniquely identified physical and virtual objects, things
and devices through the exploitation of data capture, communication
and actuation capabilities. See A. Guimarães Pereira, A. Benessia and
P. Curvelo, Agency in the Internet of Things, Publications Office of the
European Union (2013), at 7.
5. European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, OJ 2016
L 119/1.
6. Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
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thinking differently, and quantum mechanics arose as a
new branch of physics. Interestingly, it seems that cer-
tain principles elaborated within quantum theory may
be appropriate for describing data. By drawing inspira-
tion from quantum mechanics, this article aims to ulti-
mately overcome the binary notion of personal data and
find a right balance in the application of EU data pro-
tection law. This conclusion is also supported by the
fact that today it has become rather easy to identify a
data subject due to the increasing affordability of certain
processing operations and the tools to perform them.
2 Setting the Scene: We Live
in a World of Data
The idea behind the quote ‘Data is the new oil’7 is ele-
mentary: oil was – and most likely still is – the basis of
the world’s economy during the twentieth century.
Refined to produce plastics, fuel and many other mate-
rials, oil can be converted into many different commodi-
ties. A legitimate question would be, what does oil have
to do with data? Both commodities – oil and data – can
be traded and their trade volumes and prices can affect
stock markets in different ways. It was demonstrated
that changes in oil prices could predict stock market
return worldwide,8 whereas the impact that data can
have on stock markets is tied to the reliability that com-
panies feeding off the data can project on the general
public.9
Moreover, oil is not a self-sufficient commodity: once
refined and transformed its sub-products cannot be
reverted to oil. This concept was well summarised by
Scaruffi:
[T]he difference between oil and data is that the
product of oil does not generate more oil (unfortu-
nately), whereas the product of data (self-driving
cars, drones, wearables, etc.) will generate more data
(where do you normally drive, how fast/well to drive,
who is with you etc.).10
Differently from oil, not all data is equal. In this sense,
data is more comparable to rocks: there are common and
inexpensive, and rare and expensive ones. When a piece
of information refers to a human being, it becomes per-
7. The quote is often attributed to different people. See M. Kuneva, Euro-
pean Consumer Commissioner in a 2006’s Speech http:// europa. eu/
rapid/ press -release_ SPEECH -09 -156_ en. htm (last visited 24 June 2018);
G. Rometty, IBM CEO in a Speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in
2013 https:// siliconangle. com/ blog/ 2013/ 03/ 11/ ibms -ceo -says -big -
data -is -like -oil -enterprises -need -help -extracting -the -value/ (last visited
24 June 2018).
8. G. Driesprong, B. Jacobsen & B. Maat, ‘Striking Oil: Another Puzzle?’,
89 Journal of Financial Economics 307 (2008).
9. See ‘Facebook Stock is in the Red for the Year After the FTC Confirms
Investigation’, http:// fortune. com/ 2018/ 03/ 26/ facebook -stock -ftc -
investigation -cambridge -analytica/ (last visited 24 June 2018).
10. P. Scaruffi, Humankind 2.0 (2016), available at https:// www. scaruffi.
com/ singular/ bigdata. html (last visited 18 November 2018).
sonal data. Not all personal data has the same economic
value: there are different values, different pieces of
information linked to that data which can make it more
or less attractive for business operators according to the
type of business they are running.11 For an advertise-
ment company, geographical data on potential custom-
ers is valuable: the company might use that information
to target its advertisements and promptly show offers
from restaurants to nearby potential customers. This
geographical data (technically called ‘geotag’) needs to
be placed in the context of activities that a potential cus-
tomer is carrying out in a determined time and space.
Knowing the potential customer is located close to a res-
taurant whose advertisement can be shown by the
advertisement company is valuable data. If the potential
customer is hiking in a forest, however, knowing his
specific location does not bring any advertising poten-
tial, because there are no restaurants nearby to adver-
tise.12
Data is to be understood in broad terms, and according
to Ackoff, is raw and does not have a meaning in itself.13
In the case of geographical data, latitude and longitude
are just numbers, coordinates on a map; when matched
with a physical person, they become a geotag, an
information conveying that a person is physically
located somewhere. Therefore, information is data that
has been given a meaning by way of relational connec-
tion with other data.14 The meaningfulness of this
information has a different degree of appreciation for
the subject making use of it.
Another difference between data and oil is that the latter
is a scarce resource, whereas the former is virtually
infinite, self-sustainable and self-replicable. To under-
stand these concepts we can imagine a timeline, a
sequence of events starting at time 0 and ending at time
10. The actual length between 0 and 10 is not relevant.
A barrel of oil will always be a barrel of oil throughout
the timeline, or until it is transformed into something
else. On the contrary, data and the information held
within it changes according to its intended use and with
time . For example, a person’s name is likely to remain
unchanged, but if we consider body temperature, its
variation throughout a timeline might reveal other
pieces of information, such as that the person has a cold
or is performing physical activity. This different degrees
of information provided by data allows for an interesting
observation: data has both an intrinsic and extrinsic val-
ue. The intrinsic value is by virtue of the piece of
11. See also I.N. Cofone and A.Z. Robertson, ‘Privacy Harms’, 69 Hastings
Law Journal 1039, at 1049-1053 (2018) where the concept of the Pri-
vacy Bell is discussed. Despite the authors refer to privacy, and not to
data protection, the same theory could be used to describe the degree
of information on a data subject that data could provide.
12. For an in-depth analysis on the use of geotags and Big Data, see
J.W. Crampton, M. Graham, A. Poorthuis, T. Shelton, M. Stephens,
M.W. Wilson & M. Zook, ‘Beyond the Geotag: Situating ‘Big Data’ and
Leveraging the Potential of the Geoweb’, 40 Cartography and Geo-
graphic Information Science 130 (2013).
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information carried by the data. In the previous exam-
ple, it would be the fact that the body has a certain tem-
perature in a specific moment. When that information
is, however, put in correlation with the same data from a
different moment of the timeline, it allows inferring a
new information.15
For companies it makes sense to collect, aggregate and
analyse any kind of data, even the one that, prima facie,
does not seem to identify a person or highlight a pattern.
The reason is that this data could prove useful when put
in correlation with other data sets: it could show trends
and correlations in those data sets where people are
identified, thus transforming into personal data the first
data set as well.16
So far, this article has focused on the more theoretical
aspects of data and information. Now it is time to apply
those aspects to concrete cases. The world these days is
populated by smart devices capable of collecting and
sharing any type of data, by IoT, Cloud Computing and
Big Data, which are at the basis of services not even
imaginable few years ago. All these technologies are the
equivalent of the tools used to extract and refine oil.
Tiny sensors collect data, which is shared and processed
in the Cloud and ultimately stored in Big Data. Cloud,
Big Data and IoT are three different perspectives of
complex data processings: IoT gathers, Cloud processes
and Big Data stores data. This picture portrays data as a
commodity – the fuel running a complex mechanism of
systems. Thus, the fundamental question is, how is this
commodity regulated? According to EU law, data as
such is not regulated, but it becomes strictly regulated
when it can be qualified as personal. This leads to
another question: are the boundaries of personal data
and non-personal data so well defined to justify such a
binary approach to data regulation?17
15. Cofone and Robertson, above n. 11. The Privacy Bell shows mathemati-
cally how the degree of privacy changes according to the degree of
plausible assumptions that can be made on a person: more plausible
assumption, less privacy. The same concept is applicable to data protec-
tion.
16. This shows why, in academia, some researchers call the debate between
anonymous data and personal data a false debate. See S. Stalla-Bourdil-
lon and A. Knight, ‘Anonymous data v. personal data – a False Debate:
an EU Perspective on Anonymization, Pseudonymization and Personal
Data’, 34 Wisconsin International Law Journal 284 (2017) and S.Y.
Esayas, ‘The Role of Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation Under the
EU Data Privacy Rules: Beyond the ‘All Or Nothing’ Approach’, 6 Euro-
pean Journal of Law and Technology 1 (2015).
17. Some courts in the United States shared the same perplexity. See Sand-
ers v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999), where ‘privacy, for purposes of
the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are
degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of pri-
vacy’. If the case deals with privacy, the same reasoning is valid for data
protection if we consider that the presence or absence of privacy is logi-
cally linked to the fact that data is personal or not, although the right to
privacy and the right to data protection have fundamental differences in
their scopes and limitations. See e.g. Case C-28/08 P, Commission/
Bavarian Lager, [2010] ECR I-6055, para. 60, and J. Kokott and
C. Sobotta, ‘The Distinction Between Privacy and Data Protection in the
Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, 3 International Data Privacy
Law 222 (2013).
3 The Current Notion of
Personal Data: From the
GDPR to the Case Law of
the ECJ
The definition of personal data in Article 4 of the
GDPR18 largely draws from and overlaps with the old
definition enshrined in Article 2 of Directive 95/46/
CE19 (Data Protection Directive, or DPD hereinafter),
which the GDPR aimed at replacing and updating. The
main difference between the two is in the use of the con-
cept of identifier: it is used implicitly in the GDPR and
explicitly in the DPD. Identifiers are not defined in the
GDPR, but they have to be understood as a piece of
information holding a particularly privileged and close
relationship with the data subject, such as cookies or
internet protocol addresses.20 Recital 30 of the GDPR
explains that identifiers are important as they may leave
traces of the data subject in a particular environment,
which, once combined with other identifiers and
information, may be used to create profiles of the data
subjects and to identify them.21
3.1 The Practical Issues of Identifiers
Some of the issues revolving around identifiers could be
understood by analysing the Cambridge Analytica scan-
dal, which called into question how Facebook collects
and shares personal data.22 After the scandal became
public, Mark Zuckerberg (CEO of Facebook) was sum-
moned before the United States Congress and the Euro-
pean Parliament to answer on how and when Facebook
collects and shares data. A recurrent question concerned
the so-called shadow profiles.23
18. Personal data is defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable natural per-
son is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier, or to one or more factors specific to
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person’, Art. 4, GDPR, above n. 5.
19. Art. 2(a) of Directive 95/46 defines personal data as ‘any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”);
an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity’. European Parliament and Council Directive
95/46/CE, OJ 1995 L 281/31.
20. Compare with Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007
on the concept of personal data (2007) at 14.
21. See also R.E. Leenes, ‘Do You Know Me? Decomposing Identifiability’,
Tilburg University Legal Studies Working Paper No. 001/2008, where
the identifiability is divided in four subcategories: L-, R-, C- and S-iden-
tifiability. L-identifiability allows individuals to be targeted in the real
world on the basis of the identifier, whereas this is not the case for the
other three. In fact, R-identifiability can be further decomposed into the
S-type, which is a technical kludge, and C-type, which relates to the
classification of individuals as members of some set.
22. The Cambridge Analytica scandal concerned the collection of personal
data of around 84 million Facebook users by British political consulting
Cambridge, which used it to steer the US presidential elections of 2017.
23. Shadow profiles are an aggregation of information concerning a partic-
ular data subject who has not yet been formally identified. See, in par-
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Shadow profiles are based off a basic function of the
Internet: most websites collect information on visitors to
tailor services such as advertisements or store users’
preferences to provide a better browsing experience.
Facebook’s peculiarity is that whenever one of its fea-
tures (as simple as a like and share button) is embedded
in a website, it sends data about its use to Facebook,
even if the user’s activity on the webpage was only limit-
ed to browsing.24 This data is full of identifiers such as
cookies, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and many oth-
ers.25 Facebook counts around 2.2 billion users month-
ly,26 and it is not difficult to understand why most web-
sites today embed features from it, thus allowing a large
collection of identifiers. A sufficient amount of identifi-
ers can be used to infer information about a virtually
unknown person (technically, a not-yet-identified data
subject).
What is the use of this aggregated data? In the case of
Facebook, when a person registers to it, the platform
associates the shadow profile with that person. Without
shadow profiles, the database containing personal data
of a new user should be empty. Any collection of per-
sonal data should begin only at the moment of registra-
tion and, in any case, after the user has given explicit
consent to it. However, when shadow profiles are used,
correlations are done automatically by Facebook, and
the already performed data collection and analysis are
associated with that data subject. In turn, the platform
can immediately offer enhanced services such as sug-
gesting a friend list or displaying advertisements of
interest for that user in a surprisingly (or worryingly)
accurate fashion.
Identifiers as such do not do have to be understood as
personal data: they hold a privileged relationship with
the data subject because they can describe certain of his
characteristics.27 Yet, they have the potential to become
personal data, at later stages. All the more so when an
ticular, the question asked by New Mexico Representative Ben Lujan
(full transcript available at https:// techcrunch. com/ 2018/ 04/ 11/
facebook -shadow -profiles -hearing -lujan -zuckerberg/ ?guccounter= 1
(last visited 7 July 2018) and by MEP Syed Kamall (see Facebook’s writ-
ten answers available at http:// www. europarl. europa. eu/ resources/
library/ media/ 20180524RES04208/ 20180524RES04208. pdf> (last vis-
ited 7 July 2018).
24. Ibid.
25. See M.D. Ayenson, D.J. Wambach, A. Soltani, N. Good, and C.J. Hoof-
nagle, ‘Flash Cookies and Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag
Respawning’, Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 1898390;
D. Barth-Jones, ‘The ‘Re-Identification’ of Governor William Weld’s
Medical Information: A Critical Re-Examination of Health Data Identifi-
cation Risks and Privacy Protections, Then and Now’, Available at SSRN:
https:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2076397 and F.J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Sin-
gling Out People Without Knowing Their Names – Behavioural Target-
ing, Pseudonymous Data, and the New Data Protection Regulation’, 32
Computer Law & Security Review 256 (2016).
26. Statistics are referred to the second quarter of 2018, https:// www.
forbes. com/ sites/ dantedisparte/ 2018/ 07/ 28/ facebook -and -the -tyranny
-of -monthly -active -users/ #383c9c8f6aea (last visited 4 November
2018).
27. It is the case for keystroke dynamics applied for personal authentication,
which relies on the fundamental assumption that keystroke dynamics
(i.e. how a certain person types on a keyboard) is almost unique for
each person. See G. Gabla, ‘Applying Keystroke Dynamics for Personal
Authentication’ Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2508480.
identifier not conceived to collect personal data could be
re-engineered into an identifier carrying a high degree
of personal identifiability.28
The practical issue of identifiers and personal data has
been presented to better understand the impact of the
reasoning followed by the European Court of Justice.
3.2 Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
In the landmark judgement delivered on 19 October
2016 in Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland29
(Breyer hereinafter), the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (ECJ hereinafter) determined that dynamic IP
addresses constitute personal data in relation to a certain
provider, where it has the legal means that would enable
it to identify the data subject through additional data
held by another provider.
The case originated from a request for preliminary rul-
ing from the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ), in
relation to an action brought by Mr. Breyer – a former
member of the parliament in Schleswig-Holstein –
against the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning
the registration and storage by the latter of the IP
address allocated to him, alongside the date when he
accessed several websites run by German federal institu-
tions, the terms entered in the search fields and the
quantity of data transferred. Data retained by the Ger-
man federal institution, no matter how specific, did not
allow the identification of Mr. Breyer, thus falling out-
side the notion of personal data and the protection of the
DPD. However, such identification would have been
possible if the Internet Service Provider (ISP) had
revealed sufficient information to identify the person
operating behind a dynamic IP address.30
Whether static IP addresses should be considered per-
sonal data or not was already answered by the ECJ in
2011. In Scarlet Extended,31 the ECJ concluded that stat-
ic IP addresses should be considered personal data
because they allow the precise identification of the
user.32 According to the Court, there are two elements
to consider: one technical and one legal. Technically,
the ISP assigns an IP address to a device, and this IP is
always the same (static IP); legally, the underlying con-
tract for the Internet service provisioning will be under-
taken between the ISP and a natural or legal person,
under whose responsibility the connected device is
operated. This is why in Scarlet Extended the ECJ based
its conclusions on the fact that an injunction by a court
28. See Barth-Jones, above n. 25; and Zuiderveen Borgesius, above n. 25.
29. Breyer, above n. 6. Breyer was ruled under the DPD. Differences with
the GDPR will be marked throughout the analysis.
30. An IP address is a logical numeric address assigned to every device con-
nected to a network to identify it. These addresses are assigned by an
ISP to a host in a fixed or dynamic fashion. In the former case, a device
will always use the same IP address, whereas in the latter case, the IP
address is assigned each time the device connects to the network. IP
addresses exist to identify a specific device, but they are not necessarily
meant to identify the person operating it in a given moment, all the
more so when the IP address is a dynamic one. See S. Feit, TCP/IP:
Architecture, Protocols, and Implementation with IPv6 and IP Security
(1996).
31. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended, ECLI:EU:C:2011:77.
32. Ibid. para. 51.
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to an ISP to install technical means to analyse the traffic
generated by a certain IP address, in order to monitor
the use of peer-to-peer software33 used to infringe intel-
lectual property rights, was precluded by EU data pro-
tection law.34
If the nature and function of static IP addresses are
clear, dynamic IP addresses are trickier. The difference
in the identifiability features of static and dynamic IP
addresses can be understood through an example: if we
picture IP addresses as coats of different colours used to
identify doctors in a hospital, using a static IP means
that each doctor will always wear the same coat; on the
contrary, a dynamic IP address entails that each time a
doctor enters the hospital’s premises, he will be assigned
one random coat from the ones available. This latter
concept is known in information technology as Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), and it prevents
two devices from being assigned the same IP address
and thus causing a conflict in the network architecture.
That coat alone, however, does not bring sufficient
information to enable an identification of the doctor
wearing it: it holds a privileged relationship with the
data subject, but alone it does not allow its identifica-
tion.
The DPD enshrines in Recital 26 a key principle to
ascertain whether an identifier actually allows for the
identification of a data subject: the means likely reasona-
bly to be used by the controller or by any other person
to identify the data subject.35 The GDPR provides the
same principle in a same-numbered recital,36 but it adds
to it that to consider those means as ‘likely reasonably to
be used’, account should be given of all objective fac-
tors, such as costs and the amount of time required for
the identification, taking into consideration the available
technology at the time of the processing and the techno-
logical developments. In a nutshell: feasibility and capa-
bility. A technical means is likely reasonably to be used
according to the feasibility of its use and the capability of
a data controller to use it, which include technical
implementation, time and the costs and benefits of
doing so. Technical implementation, economic cost and
time need to be put in relation to the potential economic
benefit of the operation for the data controller.
The concept of means likely reasonably to be used gener-
ated a large debate in German academia, which polar-
ised around a subjective and an objective criterion.37
33. Peer-to-peer networking is a distributed computing architecture allow-
ing the partitioning of tasks between different devices (peers) connec-
ted to a network, thus allowing a substantial degree of anonymity when
sharing files of considerable size. See also R. Ambrosek, Shawn Fanning:
the Founder of Napster (2006) where the facts behind the very first
peer-to-peer software called ‘Napster’ are re-construed.
34. Notably, the ECJ ruled, ‘Directives 2000/31, 2001/29, 2004/48, 95/46
and 2002/58, read together and construed in the light of the require-
ments stemming from the protection of the applicable fundamental
rights, must be interpreted as precluding an injunction made against an
ISP which requires it to install the contested filtering system’. Scarlet
Extended, above n. 31, para. 55.
35. Recital 26, DPD, above n. 19.
36. Recital 26, GDPR, above n. 5.
37. See M. Schreibauer, ‘§ 11 Telemediengesetz (4 to 10)’, in M. Esser,
P. Kramer & K. von Lewinski (eds.), Kommentar zum Bundesdaten-
According to the objective criterion, a person can be iden-
tified when, regardless of the capability of a certain data
controller to identify him, the identification is feasible by
combining data from different sources. The subjective
criterion relies on the concrete capability of a certain data
controller to make use of its means to identify the data
subject. The main difference between the two criteria
lies in the relevance given to the data controller. For
instance, the sheer size of means available might make
all the difference in understanding whether certain data
is personal or not for that specific controller. Relativity
at its best!
In Breyer, the two criteria applied as follows: for the sub-
jective criterion, IP addresses become personal data only
when there is the concrete capacity of a provider who
has access to that information to use his own resources
to identify the data subject (e.g. by performing more
correlation with other data sets or even collecting addi-
tional data); on less theoretical grounds, by applying the
objective criterion, IP addresses become personal data
only when a data subject can be concretely identified,
regardless of the abilities and the means of a provider to
do so.38
The choice between the two criteria has a fundamental
meaning when dealing with dynamic IP addresses. In
that case, the means likely reasonably to be used to identi-
fy the data subject are allegedly more complex, expen-
sive and time consuming to implement. Thus, if theo-
retically an identification is possible (subjective criteri-
on), it does not mean that this could happen in practice
(objective criterion). The question referred to the ECJ
by the German FCJ, however, has a remarkable subjec-
tive element. What the FCJ fundamentally asks is if a
dynamic IP address stored by an online media provider
(i.e. the owner of a website) has to be considered already
personal data for that provider, in the case where only a
third party has the additional information necessary to
identify the data subject39 which accessed the online
media through that dynamic IP address in a specific
moment in time.40
The groundbreaking element of Breyer does not consist
in the ECJ’s ruling that, under certain conditions,
dynamic IP addresses are personal data, but rather in
the legal reasoning followed to reach those conclusions –
that same reasoning is applicable mutatis mutandis to
similar categories of data and subjects. This reasoning is
based on three key elements.
schutzgesetz. Nebengesetze (2014); J. Nink and J. Pohle. ‘Die Bestimm-
barkeit des Personenbezugs. Von der IP-Adresse zum Anwendungsber-
eich der Datenschutzgesetze’, in Multimedia und Recht (9/2015), at
563-67. J. Heidrich and C. Wegener, ‘Rechtliche und technische Anfor-
derungen an die Protokollierung von IT-Daten. Problemfall Logging’, 8
Multimedia und Recht 487 (2015). H. Leisterer, ‘Die neuen Pflichten
zur Netz– und Informationssicherheit und die Verarbeitung personenbe-
zogener Daten zur Gefahrenabwehr’, 10 Computer und Recht 665
(2015).
38. See Breyer, above n. 6, paras. 52-54.
39. Breyer, above n. 6, para. 31.
40. Notably, dynamic IP addresses change at every connection; thus, the
reasoning has to be strictly bound to the possibility of identifying a data
subject in a specific moment of a timeline.
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First, from a technical perspective, dynamic IP address-
es belong to the general category of metadata41: metada-
ta is not personal data, but may contain data about per-
sonal data. For instance, typical metadata applied to
personal data would be the date when the personal data
surname has been changed in a system. If we strictly
apply the binary approach adopted in the DPD or in the
GDPR, metadata stays outside the protection provided
by EU data protection law, meaning that every process-
ing operation on that metadata is possible, including
transfers outside the EU and recombination with other
data.
The second element stays in the nature of power used
by the German federal institutions to obtain information
from the ISP. Public entities can act either in their pub-
lic capacity, representing the public interest (cum impe-
rio), or as any other legal entity (sine imperio).42 When
acting cum imperio, a public administration does not act
as a peer towards its counterparts – it exercises a public
power with an outreach not possible for private opera-
tors – whereas, acting sine imperio does not entail an
exercise of public power and the outreach is the same as
any other private operator. In Breyer, the German fed-
eral institution acted sine imperio.43
The third element concerns the outreach of an action
sine imperio, which, according to the ECJ, consists of any
possible channel not prohibited by law to achieve the
desired result.44 These channels could be, for instance,
contractual clauses foreseeing the trading of metadata
between two entities acting sine imperio one against the
other.45 Such clauses could be very easily inserted in a
service provisioning agreement between different serv-
ice providers in a contract for Cloud Computing serv-
ices and,46 concerning mere metadata, none of the guar-
antees foreseen by EU data protection law could prevent
such trading.47
The three aforementioned key elements have to be tes-
ted within the framework of ‘means likely reasonably to
be used’ provided by Recital 26 of the DPD and GDPR.
Earlier we used the terms feasibility and capability, but
what the ECJ concluded in a much more complex man-
ner is that the possibility for a data controller to obtain
further data from a third party to identify a data subject
has to be understood within its capability to do so. In
fact, ‘that would not be the case if the identification of
the data subject was prohibited by law or practically
41. Metadata has to be understood as data about other data. See J. Pomer-
antz, Metadata (2015), at 16.
42. See E. Casetta, Manuale di Diritto Amministrativo (2008), at 300.
43. M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Compara-
tive Law (2007), at 1274.
44. Breyer, above n. 6, para. 47.
45. C.J. Hoofnagle, ‘Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Oth-
er Commercial Data Brokers Collect, Process, and Package Your Data
for Law Enforcement’, 29 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg 595 (2003).
46. See C. Reed, ‘Information “Ownership” in the Cloud’, Queen Mary
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45/2010.
47. Which explains why the data processing put in place by Facebook to
perform shadow profiling, despite being despicable, is perfectly compat-
ible with EU data protection rules.
impossible on account of the fact that it requires a dis-
proportionate effort’.48
Proportionality is another element that has to be
accounted for. It entails at least two sub-elements: an
effort and a subject performing it. Lifting a hundred
kilograms is a remarkable effort for a human, but is a
negligible effort for a crane. On those same lines, impos-
ing a certain contractual clause where metadata has to be
transferred to a data controller might be a negligible
effort, if that data controller is someone the size of Goo-
gle or Facebook.49 Moreover, in the proportionality
check, a significant role is also played by the reward that
those efforts bring.
The conclusion of Breyer is that dynamic IP addresses
are not personal data per se, but they can become so for
a data controller if it has lawful means to obtain any fur-
ther data that would allow the identification of the data
subject. The same reasoning is applicable to any kind of
metadata, which brings two questions: I any data poten-
tially personal data? Is the binary notion of personal data
adequate to respond to the challenges posed by the com-
plex world of Big Data?
4 Big Data, Anonymisation,
Pseudonymisation and Data
Analysis
Breyer shows how data is subject to a double relativity.
One relativity aspect concerns the very nature of the
data (personal or not) against the means that a controller
can put in place to reconstruct that data as personal; in
this case, the controller performs an identification. The
other relativity (hence double relativity) concerns the
effort needed to reconstruct non-personal data as per-
sonal, which is not relative to the means used, but to the
data controller performing it and to its capacity to do so.
To put it in different words, at the beginning of this
article I used the example of the timeline, from time 0 to
time 10. What Breyer shows is that non-personal data
located at time 0 could become personal data in another
moment of the timeline, depending on the subjects hav-
ing access directly or indirectly to it. Moreover, the pos-
sibility of non-personal data to mutate its nature
depends on the theoretical means that a controller can
potentially put in place to do so (if we opt for the sub-
jective criterion), or the means that it actually puts in
place, only when it makes use of them (if we opt for the
objective criterion).
To add another layer of complexity to this reasoning, we
should also take into account the issue of data anonymi-
sation. This practice has been described as the process
48. Breyer, above n. 6, para. 46.
49. See S. Bradshaw, C. Millard & I. Walden, ‘Contracts for Clouds: Com-
parison and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing
Services’, 19 International Journal of Law and Information Technology
187 (2011) where the authors refer to Terms and Conditions offered by
Cloud computing providers in business-to-business contracts.
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through which a data controller manipulates data sets in
a database in order to make it difficult to identify data
subjects.50 Data anonymisation is also often referred to
as ‘de-identification’.51 There are several techniques
through which data anonymisation can be achieved, and
the difference lies in the cost, complexity, ease of use
and robustness.52 In this sense, we can apply the same
proportionality check described for the transformation
of metadata in personal data: there will be an initial
effort to anonymise personal data, and the anonymisa-
tion will be as strong as the effort put in place by the
data controller to anonymise that data. Therefore, the
robustness of an anonymisation processing is directly
proportional to the effort put in place by the data con-
troller, which is also logically impacted by three factors:
the degree of robustness that the data controller wants
to achieve for those categories of personal data subject to
anonymisation; the means likely reasonably to be used to
that end and the costs and benefits balance of the ano-
nymisation processing.
Today, the possibility of using virtually unlimited com-
puting power resources, thanks to Cloud Computing53
and accessing data from tremendously big databases
called Big Data, is not reserved for big corporations or
governments. The very basis of Cloud Computing is its
capability of providing enterprise-like services for any
kind of user who can afford the price: the more power-
ful the service, the higher the price.54 Data anonymisa-
tion is surely a privacy-enhancing technology, but it is
also a threatening technology for data protection due to
the binary notion of personal data and the so-called
accretion problem.55 The accretion problem postulates
that once an adversary has linked two anonymised data-
bases together, he can add the newly linked data to his
collection of outside information and use it to help
unlock other anonymised databases.56 Theoretically, the
risk increases exponentially for each further database
correlated and, as we emphasised earlier, data protection
rules are applicable only as long as we are dealing with
personal data. If the personal element disappears, there
are no safeguards for that data. Pas gráve, one may
argue: if anonymised information suffers a data breach,
50. P. Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Fail-
ure of Anonymization’, 57 UCLA Law Review 1701, at 1707 (2010).
51. S. Latanya, ‘Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Con-
fidentiality’, 25 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 98, at 100 (1997):
‘The term anonymous implies that the data cannot be manipulated or
linked to identify an individual’.
52. See, for instance, the basic guides to data anonymisation published by
the Personal Data Protection Commission of Singapore, Guide to Basic
Data Anonymisation Techniques (2018); and the European Data Pro-
tection Supervisor, Opinion 3/2018 – EDPS Opinion on Online Manip-
ulation and Personal Data (2018).
53. S. Chen, H. Lee & K. Moinzadeh, ‘Pricing Schemes in Cloud Computing:
Utilization-Based versus Reservation-Based’, Production and Operations
Management (2018).
54. For a more detailed overview of Cloud contracts see Bradshaw, Millard
& Walden, above n. 49.
55. A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. ‘Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets’, 111 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2008).
56. See e.g. B. Krishnamurthy and C.E. Wills, ‘On the Leakage of Personally
Identifiable Information Via Online Social Networks’, 7 WOSN ‘09 Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on online social networks (2009).
nobody’s rights to data protection or privacy will be vio-
lated. From a logical perspective, this is true. The
amount of data and metadata present in Big Data, and
the simplicity with which they can be computed in a
Cloud system by anyone, however, poses a serious risk
of reidentification.57
There is another interesting debate about anonymisa-
tion, and it concerns the ‘pseudonymisation’ technique.
Pseudonymisation involves substituting the real identi-
fying information with a code number or a nickname.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has described
it as ‘the process of distinguishing identities’. Such a
process aims at collecting additional data related to the
same individual without having to know his identity.58
The problem with pseudonymisation is that it gives the
false hope of creating a safe harbour from data protec-
tion obligations,59 thus legitimating high-risk processing
operations (such as profiling) under the impression that
any claim for damages of unlawful processing could be
prevented.60 Also, the GDPR in Article 6(4)(e) provides
that pseudonymisation is an appropriate safeguard,61 at
the same level as encryption.62 In reality, the means like-
ly reasonably to be used are becoming more and more
affordable and common thanks to the technologies
described earlier. Thus, a correct risk assessment should
conclude that re-identification of a data subject is more
likely to happen than to retaining a permanent de-iden-
tification (or pseudonymisation).
It has been argued that current anonymisation techni-
ques do not favour the data subject’s right to self-deter-
mination, meaning that the degree of freedom that a
data subject can exercise on its personal data is very
limited. For instance, when personal data is anony-
mised, a data subject is faced with difficulty already at
the stage of identifying that personal data is being pro-
cessed. Thus, the data subject cannot verify whether its
57. See e.g. D’Acquisto, J. Domingo-Ferrer, P. Kikiras, V. Torra, Y.A. de
Montjoye & A. Bourka, ‘Privacy by Design in Big Data: An Overview of
Privacy Enhancing Technologies in the Era of Big Data Analytics’, ENI-
SA: European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(2015).
58. Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n. 20, at 18.
59. Esayas, above n. 16, at 6-8.
60. It is the case of the shadow profiling operations performed by Facebook
through the placement of cookies, which was fined an incremental pen-
alty of 250,000 EUR per calendar day of non-compliance by the Court
of First Instance of Brussels in a judgment of 16 February 2016. See also
the joint declaration of the French, Spanish, Belgian and Dutch Data
Protection Authorities of 4th December 2015 https:// www. cnil. fr/ sites/
default/ files/ typo/ document/ Declaration_ commune_ Groupe_ de_
contact_ Facebook. pdf (last visited 6 July 2018).
61. The same choice is made in Art. 25(1), where pseudonymisation is pre-
sented as a privacy by design measure, Art. 32(1)(a) considering pseu-
donymisation as adequate safeguard for the security of processing and
Art. 40(2)(d), where pseudonymisation becomes a key element of the
codes of conducts of enterprises.
62. Encryption can be applied to provide pseudonymisation, but the two
processing are logically distinct operations. There is a general under-
standing that key-coded data may not even be considered personal
data so far as there are appropriate measures to exclude re-identifica-
tion, such as a strong encryption algorithm, a strong encryption key and
a secure key. See W.K. Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden, ‘The Problem of
‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing: What Information is Regulated? –
the Cloud of Unknowing’, 1 International Data Privacy Law 211.
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records are getting adequate protection. This kind of
dispute is, however, substantially unfounded. Whenever
personal information is anonymised, it ceases to be per-
sonal. Thus, the data subject does not have any legal
right over it. It is for this very reason that the real
emphasis should be on the moment right before the ano-
nymisation and on the process of anonymisation itself.
Once data is anonymised, it can be transferred without
boundaries, and as the European Commission stated in
2009, this is not even considered a data transfer in the
legal sense.63 Moreover, other than giving technical
advice and guidance on which anonymisation logic exist
and what are some of their risks and advantages, and
providing examples on their use, public regulatory bod-
ies, such as national data protection authorities, cannot
do much more, as anonymisation relies on complex
algorithms that are often subject to intellectual property
rights.64
From a conceptual perspective the distinction between
personal and non-personal data is neat; yet, we under-
lined that this binary approach does not bring a real
added value when data protection has to be implemen-
ted practically, because the possibilities of identifying a
data subject are not the same for every data controller
and change according to the circumstances as well. Yet,
the legal definition of personal data remains a purely
binary one.65
If, until now, we were able to substantiate our reasoning
without the need to dig into Big Data’s technicalities,
the next set of issues inevitably demands so. Notably,
another set of problems strictly linked to the technical
aspects of Big Data – conceptually distinct from data
anonymisation and very close to data reidentifiability –
are those of data mining and predictive analysis.
Data mining is commonly defined as a set of automated
techniques used to extract buried or previously
unknown pieces of information from large databases.
Data mining makes it possible to unearth patterns and
relationships, and then use this new information to
make proactive, knowledge-driven business decisions.66
From a data protection perspective, data mining is a
processing operation and is neutral: the same data min-
ing techniques can be applied to different databases,
whether they contain personal data or not. Business
operators are increasingly relying on data mining as it
allows them to understand the market better and make
better decisions.67 Moreover, thanks to Cloud Comput-
63. European Commission, Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Trans-
fers of Personal Data from the EU/EEA to Third Countries (FAQ B.1.9)
(2009), available at http:// ec. europa. eu/ justice/ policies/ privacy/ docs/
international_ transfers_ faq/ international_ transfers_ faq. pdf (last visited
18 November 2018).
64. See Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2014 on Ano-
nymisation Techniques (2014), at 11 where the analysis revolves
around the logic behind certain anonymisation techniques, but it
refrains from referring to specific commercial solutions.
65. See also Hon, Millard & Walden, above n. 62.
66. A. Cavoukian, Data Mining: Staking a Claim on Your Privacy (1998), at
4.
67. J.P. Bigus, Data Mining with Neural Networks: Solving Business Prob-
lems from Application Development to Decision Support (1996), at 9.
ing, the costs of computing services powerful enough to
run data mining algorithms are considerably low.68 The
main issues with data mining are that by mining Big
Data, the algorithm can find patterns among data sets,
thus unveiling further information that was not original-
ly included in those data sets, and de-anonymise person-
al data that was previously anonymised.69
Predictive analysis is a particular type of statistical anal-
ysis that can provide, with a certain degree of certainty,
answers to certain questions.70 For instance, by analy-
sing a set of anonymised information, the predictive
analysis could tell whether a certain buyer of a product
is a man or a woman or if it is a reliable debtor.71 Once
one anonymised information is de-anonymised (remem-
ber the accretion problem, and the proportional effort),
all the other anonymised information about that (now)
identified data subject is immediately correlated to him
or her: this is what technically happens behind the cur-
tains of Facebook’s shadow profiling.
The relativity of personal data, and the ease with which
the virtual border between personal and non-personal
data can be disregarded, calls for a different approach, a
different conception of personal data – one more
attuned with the reality of data processing taking place
in today’s world – a notion of personal data that draws
from quantum mechanics.






Quantum mechanics is a branch of physics developed in
the early twentieth century by brilliant minds such as
Erwin Schrödinger, Max Planck, Neils Bohr, Albert
Einstein and Werner Heisenberg following a series of
educated guesses inspired by a thorough knowledge of
physics.72 Quantum theory aimed to describe and
explain the behaviour of matter at an atomic and subato-
mic level, which could not be explained by classical
physics, in order to answer very practical questions such
as why hot objects glow at a different colour depending
I.N. Cofone, Ignacio & A. Robertson, ‘Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral
World’, 69 Hastings Law Journal 1471 (2018).
68. P. Ruxandra-Stefania, ‘Data Mining in Cloud Computing’, 3 Database
Systems Journal 67 (2012).
69. Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n. 64, at 5.
70. See E. Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will
Click, Buy, Lie, or Die (2016).
71. On the problem of credit scoring see D.K. Citron and F.A. Pasquale,
‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’, 89 Wash-
ington Law Review 1, at 16 (2014).
72. S.M. Barnett, J. Jeffers & J.D. Cresser, ‘From Measurements to Quan-
tum Friction’, 18 Journal of Physics: Condensed Matter S401 (2006).
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on their temperature. This article does not claim to
redefine quantum physics or enrich its postulations but
humbly aims at borrowing specific observations and
applying them to data protection law to check whether
they could be of help in ultimately providing a more fit-
for-purpose definition of personal data.
The basic intuition is that the issue of describing (or
measuring) the nature of data as personal or non-per-
sonal is very similar to the problems that the illustrious
minds behind quantum theory tried to resolve. Bohr
wrote, ‘[A] measurement to a certain degree deprives
the information given by a previous measurement of its
significance for predicting the future course of the phe-
nomena. Obviously, these facts not only set a limit to
the extent of the information obtainable by measure-
ments, but they also set a limit to the meaning which we
may attribute to such information’.73 If we consider a
single data in today’s interconnected and complex
world, its size and velocity of transmission are negligi-
ble. Any data (personal or not), regardless of its ability
to provide descriptive details of a data subject, is shared
between systems at very high speed similar to what hap-
pens to protons and electrons in a subatomic system.
For the same reason, Bohr concluded that what matters
is the unambiguous description of the matter’s behav-
iour, rather than its measurement in a given moment.74
Our starting point is the conclusion reached by the ECJ
in Breyer: data can be personal or non-personal some-
times, according to certain criteria. This emphasises the
need to have a notion of personal data capable of provid-
ing an unambiguous description, rather than a measure-
ment. The same matter can be better understood
through Schrödinger’s famous cat experiment.
Schrödinger’s cat is a thought experiment imagined in
1935 by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger75 and used to
describe two fundamental principles of quantum
mechanics: quantum superposition and quantum entan-
glement. Specifically, the experiment involves a cat in a
sealed box with a bottle of poison, a Geiger counter and
a radioactive source. The radioactive source has a 50 per
cent chance of decaying. As soon as the Geiger counter
detects the decay, a mechanism breaks the bottle of poi-
son in the box, killing the cat. It is not possible to know
if the cat is dead or alive before opening the box. Thus,
the cat, in the timeline of the experiment, is both dead
and alive at the same time. This state of matter is descri-
bed in quantum mechanics as quantum superposition,
and it entails that any two or more quantum states (the
cat is dead or alive) can be added together (hence the
name superposition) and the result will be another valid
quantum state (for the cat, that status would be the cat
being dead and alive at the same moment).76 The main
difference with binary systems is that in those, the result
73. A. Plotnitsky, Niels Bohr and Complementarity. An Introduction
(2012), at 68.
74. J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek, Quantum Theory and Measurement
(2014), at 5.
75. E. Schrödinger, ‘Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik’,
23 Naturwissenschaften 807 (1935).
76. P.A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics (1947), at 1-18.
can only be true or false, 1 or 0, but never both together,
whereas in quantum mechanics the result can be 1, 0 or
a combination of the two.
Quantum superposition could also be understood
through the famous heads or tail, where a coin is flipped
in the air and the players have to guess on which side
the coin is going to land. In a timeline that goes from 0
to 10, where 0 is the moment just before the coin is flip-
ped and 10 is the moment when the coin lands showing
one of the two faces, in any moment between 0 and 10
the coin is potentially showing both heads and tail.
In our case, the cat or the coin represents data. The fact
that the cat is dead or alive or the coin flips on one face
or the other represents the fact that data is measured as
personal or not. Theoretically, from an observer stand-
point, every data not yet identified as personal behaves
in the same manner: it is non-personal as long as a data
controller does not perform a processing operation suit-
able of correlating that non-personal data with personal
data or an individual, thus converting its nature from
non-personal to personal. What puts data in the super-
position state is the availability of the means likely rea-
sonably to be used by a data controller to identify a data
subject from that data. This is why we used the adverb
‘theoretically’. Theoretically, we could envisage a set of
non-personal data that is kept isolated from any process-
ing operation capable of putting it in correlation with
other databases. This is possible either because that
non-personal data is collected and stored in a way to be
inaccessible or non-compatible with any other data set
(thus preventing reidentification) or just because it is
swiftly deleted after having achieved its purpose. It was
noted, however, that these cases are an exception rather
than the rule.77
Observing that data is in the quantum superposition
state also entails another logical conclusion. Quantum
superposition as such is a neutral state: it comprises the
case where data becomes personal, but also the opposite,
where personal data is anonymised and loses its identifi-
cation properties.78 This observation is significant for
understanding another concept described by quantum
mechanics: quantum entanglement.
Quantum entanglement is a very particular quantum
mechanical, physical phenomenon79 in which two parti-
cles are so deeply linked that they share the same exis-
tence, no matter their physical distance. Once two parti-
cles are entangled, even if they are in the superposition
status, their measurement will bring the same result.80
To resume our example of heads or tails, if we flip two
coins, and these are entangled, any measurement taken
during their spin would lead to the same result: the two
coins showing the same face. In the case of data, the
entanglement consists in the possibility of linking
together information from different data sets and pro-
77. Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n. 64, at 5.
78. Alternatively, pseudonymised with all the caveats highlighted before.
79. A. Einstein, B. Podolsky & N. Rosen, ‘Can Quantum-Mechanical
Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?’, 47 Physics
Review 777 (1935).
80. Wheeler and Zurek, above n. 74, at 422-5.
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cessing it in a specific time. At the time of processing, if
one data becomes personal, then all the other data from
different data sets linked to it exhibit quantum entangle-
ment, and they become personal data too. The bond
shared by the different data is their possibility of pro-
viding a piece of information sufficient to identify dif-
ferently the data subject. Then, the fact that this data
can be put in correlation provides the entanglement that
changes the nature of data that was not personal, in a
domino-effect fashion.
Going back to Breyer, the collection of dynamic IP
address and log files by the online media provider con-
sists of specific data on a particular subject’s factual cir-
cumstances.81 The data subject has yet to be identified
as Mr. Breyer, and the identification becomes possible
only when the ISP reveals information sufficient to ach-
ieve the identification. The data held by the ISP and the
data held by the online media provider are entangled.
They are physically distant, because they are stored in
two different systems that are not linked physically or
logically to one another; once superposition is triggered
by the means likely reasonably to be used by the online
media provider, the data in the two systems exhibit
entanglement and can ultimately be measured as personal
data. In other words, the entanglement among all the
data present in the two data sets allows for an immediate
measurement as personal data when a bridge is built
between them: this bridge involves the possibility of
putting in correlation one non-personal data from a data
set with one personal data from another data set. This
operation instantly exposes the entanglement (due to the
correlations already made within each database), and all
data suddenly becomes personal.
Notably, the entanglement – this intangible link or, to
use the words of Einstein, this ‘spooky action at a dis-
tance’82 – involves the fact that certain data are inher-
ently capable of describing an action, a property or a fact
of a data subject. Through this description, data can
directly or indirectly contribute to the identification of
the data subject. Therefore, the intangible link consists
in the fact that all data originates from the same data
subject.
6 Quantum Theory and the
GDPR
This long and complicated reasoning explained in the
previous sections leads to two important conclusions.
First, a correct approach to the notion of personal data
should aim at providing an unambiguous description of
it, rather than a predetermined measurement. In prac-
tice, this means taking into account the fact that data is
81. Breyer, above n. 6, paras. 23-24.
82. A. Einstein, ‘Reply to Criticism: Remarks Concerning the Essays Brought
Together in This Co-Operative Volume’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (1949) 665.
in the quantum superposition state and could exhibit
quantum entanglement.
A binary approach fails at grasping these complexities
and, above all, fails at describing the true nature of per-
sonal data in a world of Big Data and infinite possible
processing operations. Quantum superposition and
quantum entanglement are a great aid in describing the
reality of what can happen to data and personal data
when placed in the context of the free-flow of
information, and where practically any data controller
has access to technical or legal means likely reasonably
to be used to achieve the identification of the data sub-
ject. Second, rather than measuring the nature of data in
a given moment and anchoring to it the applicability of
EU data protection law, the focus should be on the pro-
cessing operations triggering quantum superposition
and what surrounds them – meaning that the focus
should be on those means likely reasonably to be used to
transform non-personal data into personal data. The
status (personal or not) of data cannot be measured with
sufficient certainty or, better, cannot describe the nature
of data unambiguously because that status might change
in the future depending on the data controller attempt-
ing the identification and its available means. If we
assume that most data can potentially become personal,
from a risk-regulation perspective, it is safer to assume
that data is in the superposition status. The focus then
shifts on the means used to entangle data and on the
safeguards that should apply to those processing opera-
tions. In fact, due to those processing operations data
exhibits entanglement and can be measured as personal.
On applying quantum superposition to the notion of
personal data, the result necessarily moves away from a
binary approach and three statuses of data can be
observed: personal, non-personal and potentially per-
sonal. Personal data is data that has already identified
(directly or indirectly) a data subject; non-personal data
is data that does not and cannot (even theoretically)
identify a data subject; finally, potentially personal data is
a residual category, a grey zone, for which identification
has not occurred yet, but it has not been excluded
either.
If we apply the notion of entanglement to these three
new categories, the focus becomes the processing opera-
tion that forces data to exhibit quantum entanglement.
As a consequence, despite not having measured data as
personal in a specific moment, some provisions of the
GDPR should be applicable. The rationale behind this
consequence lies in the fact that the GDPR foresees
obligations and safeguards that could be respected by
data controllers without identifying a data subject. This
core group of obligations, I argue, would represent a
standard for best practice that should be capable of
shielding the data controller from liabilities, and possi-
ble data subject from damages.83 Moreover, this conclu-
83. The data subject is considered as eventual because its identification has
not happened yet, but could happen at a later stage, when the damage
has already been caused. It will be always the case, for instance, for the
transfer of personal data in a third country that does not provide an
adequate level of safeguards according to Chapter V of the GDPR. In
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sion allows avoiding any measurement a posteriori of
data as being personal, similarl to the conclusions of the
ECJ in Breyer. Finally, a solution of this kind would be
desirable in a legal framework where administrative
fines for unlawful processing of personal data could
have significant economic consequences, such as reach-
ing €10,000,000 or 2 per cent of the annual turnover of a
company.84
We mentioned earlier this core group of provisions of
the GDPR which should be applicable regardless of the
measurement of data as personal in a specific moment.
To conclude this section it seems worth presenting a
table (Table 1) including these provisions and the
rationale behind their applicability.
In conclusion, the core group of provisions listed in
Table 1 should provide a fair balance between meeting
the need of data controllers to carry out their businesses
in a profitable manner without excessive burdens and
preventing them from harming data subjects involuntar-
ily. The listed provisions deal with the correct manage-
ment of data flow in a company and should already be in
place for other reasons, mostly linked to the monitoring
of the business activities, their profitability and the
development of new processing operations.
7 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this article has been to demonstrate that,
despite the best intentions to regulate personal data in a
stringent manner, its legal notion has very practical
implications. We live in a world dominated by data
exchanges, where the saying ‘If you are not paying for it,
then you are the product’ is dramatically fitting. The
Cambridge Analytica scandal showed that the possibility
of transforming data into personal data is very real, and
Breyer demonstrated its legal implications. In both
cases, the binary notion of personal data seemed to be a
weak tool to determine the applicability of EU data pro-
tection law.
this case, (not yet personal) data can be legally transferred; yet, when
that data is used for the identification of the data subject or to enrich a
profiling operation that has already taken place, the ultimate result is
that the data subject is damaged, but has no legal claim over the data
controller that performed the transfer.
84. Art. 83(4) of the GDPR. That amount can be doubled easily according
to paras. 5 and 6 of the same article, in case where a company bases its
core business on processing data, which only afterwards reveals to be
processing of personal data. In fact, paras. 5 and 6 deal with specific
cases where either the processing operation went too far and the data
subject is irremediably damaged by this or the data controller does not
comply with an order of the supervisory authority. In the case where
the processing of data is based on the wrong assumption that the data
processed is not personal, it is very common to have data transfers
towards third countries outside the guarantees of Chapter V. Thus, the
processing operations are also engineered on that wrong assumption,
and redesigning them is a process that necessarily takes a certain
amount of time, during which the company can easily be put out of
business.
Similar to the problems that physicists had to solve
when quantum theory was developed, the notion of per-
sonal data has to describe unambiguously the behaviour
of personal data in a real-world scenario. The conse-
quences of not doing so are to be mistaken by the meas-
urement of data as personal (or not) in a specific
moment, with the certainty that such a result could be
reversed at a later stage. This is all the more so when the
whole applicability of EU data protection rules depends
on that measurement.
The article shows that quantum theory may provide a
better point of view, thus enabling the selection of a
number of core provisions of the GDPR to avoid the
detriment of data subjects, who could suffer damages,
and of data controllers, which will have to pay for those
damages.
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Tabel 1 Core group of GDPR provisions
Points (b), (c), (d) and (f) of Article 5(1):
Article 5 deals with the principles related to the processing of personal data. In particular, the principles of purpose limitation, data
minimisation, accuracy and integrity and confidentiality should be applicable. In turn, those provisions that are strictly related to the
presence of a data subject (or the possibility of identifying it) have been excluded.85 The reasoning is that the data controller might
deal with data for which he does not have means likely reasonably to be used to identify the data subject, and may be completely
unaware of the fact that that data could lead to the identification of a data subject.86 On the contrary, the principles we identified as
applicable are related to the design of the processing operations and prevent reckless processing of data.
Point (f) of paragraph 1 and paragraph 4 of Article 6:
Article 6 deals with the lawfulness of processing. Although we deemed as not necessary the provision under point (a) of Article 5(1),
the lawfulness referred to in point (f) of Article 6(1) refers to the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller, for instance, its
freedom to conduct business. Article 6(4) enriches Article 6(1) and sets further limitations to the processing operations, which
include an assessment of the compatibility of the reasons for the further processing, of the need to use encryption or pseudonymisa-
tion and an evaluation of the type of data that is being further processed.
Point (f) of Article 14(2):
While Article 14 entails the existence of an identified data subject, the overall goal of the article can be understood from Recital 30
of the GDPR. The idea is that the data controller has to keep track of the personal data it processes. If we apply quantum superposi-
tion, and we accept the conclusion that data could turn into personal data at some point, then the data controller should always
keep track of where it gets data, where it sends it for further processing, from how long that data is kept and if it transfers it outside
the EU.
Section I of Chapter IV, Articles 24 to 31:
Section I of Chapter IV, Articles 24 to 31 establish the obligations between data controllers and data processors. The relationship
between the two is fundamental to establishing a good model of governance for the processing operation because although the
data processor processes data on behalf of the data controller, it might have a certain degree of flexibility in how certain operations
are technically performed.
Article 33:
Article 33 on the notification of data breach towards authorities should be applicable every time a data controller is not able to dem-
onstrate that the data processed under its responsibility is non-personal data according to the notion we provided earlier, meaning
that the data breach notification should be performed every time the controller has not taken steps to ensure that the data pro-
cessed is non-personal data. Data protection authorities should be put in the position of knowing whether a breach of data that is
potentially personal could lead different entities, such as cybercriminals, to use the breached data sets with other data sets and ulti-
mately identify data subjects.87
85 In particular, the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency and the principle of storage limitation entail obligations that are deter-
mined by the data subject. For instance, those two principles will be applied in a very different manner if the data subject is an adult or a
minor.
86 If we consider that data is in the superposition status, and the data controller did not take any measure to make sure that data falls in the
non-personal data category, then it is legitimate to conclude that another data controller might get access to that data in superposition and
make use of its means to combine it with other personal data and ultimately make the data in superposition exhibit entanglement, thus trans-
forming it into personal data.
87 The accretion problem as such is a neutral process and can be used for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.
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Article 37:
The designation of the data protection officer should become the rule where data is processed on a large scale. The designation
should be based on the exception provided for in paragraph 4.
Chapter V, Articles 44 to 50:
Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations are risky operations by nature because data is transferred
to a different jurisdiction with different (or no) safeguards. For this reason, the GDPR allows such transfers only in very limited cir-
cumstances and only where the data controller or processor have adopted appropriate safeguards. Therefore, considering the quan-
tum superposition of data, this whole Chapter should be applicable in all cases where the data controller did not put in place mecha-
nisms to ensure that data falls in the non-personal data category. The reason for such a stringent conclusion is that once data is
transferred outside the EU, it does not matter if it becomes personal: it will still be outside the reach of EU data protection safe-
guards. All the more so in the case where economic operators amass vast amounts of potentially personal data (e.g. dynamic IP
addresses) and perform the reidentification of subjects outside the EU, in countries where there are no safeguards for personal data
and operations like mass-profiling for surveillance reasons are common.88 The result of that identification can facilitate the use of
data mining and predictive analytics techniques, which would ultimately unveil even more personal data on the data subject, with
the final goal of using this aggressive profiling on that data subject in the EU.
88 It is the case for the very recent Social Credit System developed by China. According to this, nothing prevents the fact that China amasses a
large amount of potentially personal data and performs the identification of tourists or foreigners visiting China, at the border, where biomet-
ric data is collected from pictures. See, for instance, G. Sgueo, ‘Tetris, La Cina e la gamification dei servizi pubblici’, available at http:// www.
forumpa. it/ citta -e -territorio/ tetris -la -cina -e -la -gamification -dei -servizi -pubblici (last visited 8 November 2018), and A. Cagaan, ‘China’s Social
Credit System raises privacy concerns over surveillance’, available at https:// www. veridiumid. com/ blog/ chinas -social -credit -system -raises -
privacy -concerns -surveillance/ (last visited 8 November 2018). It was also the case for the Prism programme run in the United States by the
National Security Agency, which was the main driver behind the ECJ judgment in Case C-362/14 Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner, where the court stated that the EU-US Safe Harbour Agreement was not a legitimate tool for the transfer of personal data
from the EU to the United States . See A. El Khoury, ‘The Safe Harbour Is Not A Legitimate Tool Anymore. What Lies In the Future of EU-USA
Data Transfers?’, 6 European Journal of Risk Regulation 659 (2015).
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